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INFORMATION, CONSTRAINT, AND MEANING
Martin Zwick
Systems Science PhD Program
Portland State University
Portland, Oregon 97207
ABSTRACT

.·

Despite the familiar and correct
discl3imer that information theory
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949) does not concern the semantic level of communication,
the technical definition of information
nonetheless bears directly and importantly on the subject of meaning.
Meaning, at least in one sense of the
word, is the recognition of constraint
and is based on isomorphism of structure. Constraint reduces information
yet information is also the very ~ubstrate of meaning. Meaning is thus the
union of the informative and the intelligible (Moles, 1958), the reconciliation of this dialectical opposition
being achievable in several different
ways.
1

It is commonly understood that
"information" in the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon and Weaver,
1949) refers only to the technical as?ects of signal transmission and not at
a~l to questions of meaning.
To deal
with such questions, Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953, 1964) developed a semantic
theory of information formally similar
to ~hannon's theory but based upon a
l?gical, as opposed to statistical, notion of probability. The Shannon
entropy expression, H = -! pJ. log p.,
.
in
t h e semantic theory is used for J
the average uncertainty associated with
a set of possible meanings, as compared
in the technical theory, to the average'
uncertainty associated with a set of
(emit~ed or received) symbols.
Both the
technical and semantic theories are thus
essentially theories of selection,
But by virtue of this formal similarity, the technical and semantic levels
re~ain fully distinct and unbridgeable.
This complete separability of levels pre~ludes a~y quantitative linkage between
information and meaning, though meaning
depends upon the receipt of information
a~d if meaning is to be quantified, one'
might ex9ect that its amount should be
a f~nction ~f (and possibly vary monotonically with) the amount of information. The relationship, however, must
be more complex since from a random
sequence of symbols one gains maximum
information, but no meaning. Indeed,
Weaver remarked on his vague feeling
that
Published in:

information and mean~ng may
prove to be something like a
pair of canonically conjugate
variables in quantum theory
. subject to some joint
restriction that condemns a
person to the sacrifice of the
one as he insists on having
much of the other • .
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p 28)
but gave no specific basis for such a
complementarity. The purpose of this
note is to pursue this suggestion further and by doing so demonstrate a
complex relationship between infor~ation,
constraint, and meaning.
Information, for Shannon and Weavec,
is reduction in uncertainty i c -~u =
uinitial - ufinal'
If a definite messase
is received, i.e., the final uncertain~·;
is zero, then the information gained is.
equal to the initial uncertainty. Messages from a source about which there is
complete initial uncertaintv, i.e., a
random source, carry maximum infoc~a:ion.
Thus, for example, if a sequence of symbols s 1 , s ,
. sn is recei•1ed, one
2
gains maximal information when receio"
of sj in no way reduces the uncertai;ty
of what sj+l (and succeeding symbols)
will be. To the extent that the source
is nonrandom and there exist cor.strain"s
between symbols at different times, the
information provided by the message is
reduced (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; ~iller,
1963) •

Constraint reduces information. Yet
strong constraint is oresent in natura!
language, e.g., ir. the secuence of le:ters in words and of word~ in sentences.
This constraint is normally referred ~o
as redundancy; and for the English language, redundancy is approximately 50%
(Shannon and IYe;iver, 1949). This redundancy muse be performing some useful
function, since it reduces the information content of messages from what is
theoretically achievable. The fur.ction
is normally assumed to be error correction: if part of the message is lost,
redundancy enhances the ~ossibility that
the receiver can reconstruct what was
lost or ignore it.
It is unlikely, however, that the
function of error correction accounts
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sufficiently for redundancy in language.
Consider an ideal communication
situation where the message received is
exactly the message sent.
Error correction would not be necessary, so a
redundancy-free language would seem to
be ootimal, since a minimal number of
symbols would be required for any message.
Yet such a language is hardly
conceivable.
Because of the complete
absence of constraint between sequential symbols, a message will appear to
be coming from a random source.
How
could it be understood? The message
will be perceived as a unit without
carts since there can be no basis to
demarcate substrings in a string of
symbols emitted from a random source.
For parts to exist in some relation,
some constraint must exist between them,
which has by assumption been precluded.
The meaning of such a message
would have to be looked up in a (vast)
reference table.
This follows from
the unitary character of every message:
each will be mappable onto a
unique number with a unique meaning.
(E.g., message #2,092,154 might be
translated·as "The dog chased the
cat.")
Such a table would have to
encompass all possible linguistic
utterances, whose number is extremely
large, indeed noncomputable.
So a
table cf this sort could not in fact
be ?repared.
One may object: why
should it be necessary to translate
the original message into a natural
language utterance? Why cannot each
message (say, "2,092,154") "point"
directly to its meaning, i.e., to our
ex?erience of the world received via
the senses?
This raises the central question:
What is required for experience to have
meaning, which can be the semantic content of a message? The answer has been
clearly articulated by Ashby (1956).
For experience to be comprehensible,
some constraint must exist in the elements of experience.
(Mathematically,
constraint between two variables, say
x and y, is defined set-theoretically
(Wiener, 1917), as the joint occurrence
of (x, y) in only a subset of the Cartesian product of the sets of x and y
values).
What can be understood is
constraint, i.e., the order which we
see or lp~rhaps) project onto the world.
If what is intelli~ible in experience is constraint, it is natural that
the means by which we represent or express experience should exhibit a
corresvonding constraint.
Constraint
implies redundancy.
Here, then, is a
second explanation for redundancy in
language.
Constraint is a basis for
meaning. The meaning of an utterance

is based on a mapping between the constraint embodied in experience and the
constraint represented in language.
To
be more precise:
What is mapped are
elements and the constraining relations
between them.
In language, the words
are the elements; the nonarbitrary
sequence of words in sentences, the constraints.
(Words themselves are
constrained forms of smaller units, and
sentences are elements in larger units,
but we shall here ignore these other
levels of language.)
Words map onto
different "chunked" aspects of our ex?e:ience 1 sentences map onto the relations
we perceive between these chunked aspects.
There are thus at least two
senses of "meaning":
meaning l • the ma?ping of one element onto another, and ·
meaning 2 , the mapping of a relation
(constraint) onto a relation (in addition to a mapping of elements onto
elements).
The first sense of "meaning" is
fairly simole, namelv the relation of
symbol and referent, e.g., the relatior.
of the word "dog" to the familiar fourlegged creature referred to.
It is in
this sense of meaning that "2,092,154"
can mean "The dog chased the cat." Only
this type of meaning is possible in a
language with no redundancy; this also
resembles Bar-Hillel and Carna?'s notion
of meaning as involving a selection from
a set of possibilities.
0

0

The second sense of "meaning" includes the first as a component, b~t is
more com?lex.
Meaning2 is the isomorphism of two or more structures, where
"structure" is a set of elements organized by some constraint.
If the
constraint in a received message is
sufficiently isomorphic to some reference constraint, the former is taken to
"mean" the latter.
The reference constraint can be internal, e.g., some
mental representation of past experience,
or external; and the two structures can
be given either in the same or in different modes of representation.
Meaning 2
arises from the recognition of constraint.
Constraint can be quantitativel;
assessed as information-theoretic
"transmission," which we will write as
"c."
For a message consisting of n sym•

c "'

~

j

u ( s.)

J

Snr

. s )
n

The u's represent initial uncer~ainties;
the final uncertainties are zero.
u(s , s ,
. sn) is thus the informa1
2
tion gained, i, upon receipt of the
message.
~ u(sj)
is the maximum inforJ
mation which could ?OSsibly have been

gained, were there no redundancy in the
message, and is a constant, call it K,
for all fixed length messages. Thus,
c + i

=K

i.e., the sum of the amount of constraint and the amount of information
is constant. Thus redundancy, defined
as g ,is necessary, not merely for
I<

error-correction, but more fundamentally
for structure, from which there arises
the possibility of meaning 2 •
One could then conceivably express
the dependence of meaning upon constraint
in terms of a monotonic dependence of
the quantity of the former upon the
quantity of the latter, i.e., by m..Cc.
Given i + c = K, here is a clear basis
for Weaver's idea of information and
meaning being "subject to ~he sacrifice
of one . . • {from} • . • having much
of the other," quoted earlier.
aut the matter is more complex and
perhaps even paradoxical. Meaning 2 ,
being based on an isomorphism of structure, requires that a message embody
constraint. Constraint reduces information. Yet meaning presupposes and
depends upon the receipt of informaation: and if the meaning of a message
could be quantified, it might be expected also to vary monotonically with
the message's information content. A
message with little information cannot
support much structure and thus much
meaning. Hence constraint is necessary
for meaning, yet also, as it were,
undermines (reduces) it.
This analysis is not restricted to
language, but applies to all forms of
communication. Information and constraint must similarly be balanced in
the visual arts, in music, etc. Too
much information becomes chaos, which
has no meaning. Too much constraint
is boring because, however "meaningful''
the communication is, it conveys too
little information.
This dialectical tension has been
eloquently and extensively discussed
by Moles (1958) who notes the fundamental opposition in all forms of
communication between what is intelligible and what is informative. This
idea serves as the foundation for
Moles' rich and deep analysis of the
relationship between information theory
and aesthetic perception, this analysis
showing conclusively that, desoite the
oft-cited and necessary disclaimer that
Shannon's theory does not explicitly
deal with meaning (which, strictly
speaking, is correct), the technical
theory nonetheless bears very considerably--and directly--on this

important subject.
There are at least three ways by
which tension between variety (information) and constraint can be satisfactorily resolved. In the first, a compromise
or balance is reached between the two
conflictin9 needs. In the second, the
extremes are not subjected to compromise
but are superposed. The message is
divided into two parts, one embodying
extreme constraint, the other embodying
extreme variety, so that the goals are
met separately. In the third, th;;re is
also no compromise but the conflicting
needs for variety and constraint are
satisfied sequentially in time, either
once or repeatedly.
One might represent quantitatively
the strategy of com?romise. Let m equal
the "amount" of meaning 2 in a message.
If, from one point of view, m should
vary directly with the amount of constraint in a message and yet, from
another perspective, it should vary di
rectly with the amount of information
in a message, one might consider the
possibility of writing m = 5ic, where E
is some constant. Since i + c = K,
maximum m is obtained when i = c = K,
2
i.e., when redundancy is 50%. This, we
recall, is the redundancy of English,
and the comparable figure for French is
45\ (Moles, 1953); presumably ::he redundancies of other languages tend to
be closer to this value rather than tQ
either extreme of O or 100\. This analysis is suggestive as a starting point
for more intensive study, but should not
yet be take~ too seriously.
Another ouantitative illustration
can be given ior this idea of compcomise.
The analysis (Voss and Clark, 1975,
1978; see also Gardner, 1978) of the
sound spectra of musical works {of
greatly varying styles--from Bach and
Beethoven to the Beatles) reveals correlations of strength inversely
proportional to frequency; that is,
music resembles what physicists call l/f
noise. Such correlations lie intermediate between white noise, whose
frequency spectrum is flat and which
corresponds to the complete absence of
order, and Brownian noise, which is more
ordered and has correlations varying
inversely with the sguare of the frequency. The l/f 1 spectrum is
"intermediate" between 1/fo and l/f 2
spectra: music represents a compromise
between high information (white noise)
and moderate constraint (Brownian noise).
To avoid the implication that there
is some specific optimal balance of information and constraint, it might be
preferable to speak of a range

of compromise values.or a "plateau of
meaning" between the extremes of
order (maximum constraint) and chaos
(maximum information) as shown in
Figure 1.
(The plateau imagery is
adapted from Miller, 1971; Hardin,
196 3.)
plateau of meaning

maximum
information

:naximum
constraint
Figure L

One might also fold the horizontal axis over, giving the
representation of Figure 2: meaning
now increases monotonically in one
direction.
minimal meaning
due to
insufficient
constraint
maximal
meaning
minimal meaning
due to
insufficient
information
Figure 2.

Or, one might employ catastrophetheoretic imagery (Thom, 1974). Using
the dual of the cusp catastrophe (where
the region inside the bifurcation set
corresponds to a stable equilibrium
surface), we have the representation of
Figure 3.

constraint
region of
effective
communication

information

Figure 3. Constraint and information
treated as independent variables (K
is allowed to vary).

With the simple schema of Figure 1,
one might interpret the aim of certain
movements in the arts as the widening of
this plateau in the direction of one or
the other extremes, Minimal art (typified, say, by some monochromatic
painting, in its most extreme manifestation by. a white on white canvas) is an
extension in the direction of maximal
constraint. The "randomness• of some of
the creations of Jackson Pollock or John
Cage are attempts to extend the domain
of effective communication in the opposite direction, towards maximal varietv.
Cage has also experimented at the other
extreme, i.e., with minimal forms having
extreme order.
In the face of overly chaotic or
constrained forms, a viewer/listener ma/
be forced to become aware of more--or
new fprms of--constraint or variety than
was initially apparent. The first impression of a work of art or music as
being too chaotic or too ordered may
really be the product of artistic tradition, social convention, and/or
personal habit.
Artistic ex?eriments probing the
meaningful limits of order or chaos ~~y
also depend for their success U?on a
different mechanism. Such works operate at a meta-level of communication,
saying, in effect: this is art desoi~e
its extreme randomness, or despite lts
extreme order. The "frame message" of
the work (Hofstadter, 1978), the primary communication of any message that
it is in fact a message, guarantees at
least a certain kind of meaning, irrespective of content. What is exhioited
in museums, performed on stages, etc
or what is don~ by "artists," is defined
and usually accepted (sometimes reluctantly) as art.
As Hofstadter has pointed out, such
communications require, for their appreciation, familiarity with the history and
current manifestations of the ?articular
art form. This meaning is not internal,
i.e., deriving from some constraint uoon
variety, but external.
It is neither·
meaning 1 (a label or map?ing invoked oy
some act of selecti,n), nor meaning
(an
2
isomorphism of constraint), but a third
alternative:
the communication in its
entirety is an element in a larger system, which consists of other elements
constrained by a higher level relation.
Meaning 3 is defined in terms of context.
To put it simply: meaning is based on
2
"structure," the internal order present
in a system, while meaning is oased on
3
"function• or "history,• the external order in which it participates, whether
synchronic or diachronic. The three
senses of meaning are summarized diagram-

matically in Figure 4.

R

r

--meanin92
8

Figure 4.
uThree Senses of Meaning.• Elements
e , e , and e are organized (constrained) by
2
1
3
relation r, to form system A. Mean1ng 2 is the
isomorphism of system A with some other syst~m,
8. Meaning is a simpler concept, referring to
1
the mapping of a structureless element, say e 2 ,
onto some other element, say 9. System A can
also act as an element, E1 , in a higher level
system constrained by relation R. T~e entire
system can have a meanin9 3 by virtue of the
relation R of E to other ele~ents, E2 , E3 , and
1
E4.

In terms of either meaning 1 or
meaning 3 , a message is treated as a
unit.
(For meaning 1 the message is
structureless, while for meanin9 3 it
may have some internal order which
underlies its relations to other units.)
For both meaning 1 and meanin9 3 , therefore, the preceding discussion of
com~lementarity of information and
constraint is irrelevant; such considerations ap?ly only to meaning 2 .

T~e

second means ~Y whic~ the need Ecr
both variety and constraint may be
reconciled, namely the partioning of a
message in two, is illustrated by th~
DHA molecule which f~lfills Schrodin;er's
scientific prophecy tnat t~e physical
substrate of genetic ~emory should be
an •aperiodic crystal." DNA is sucn a
union of opposites: ~aximal con~train:
is embodied in the crystalline, i.e.,
perfectly periodic, sugar-phosphate
backbone of each strand of the molecule;
maximal information is embodied in the
aperiodicity, i.e., irregular sequence,
of bases attached to ~ne sugars (Fi;uc~
5) •

"aperiodic __,.

crystal"

-~

Figure 5.
Symbolic representation of one (st:etchedout) strand of DNA illustrating Schrodinger's idea of
•.
an aperiodic crystal.
(S = sugar, P ~ phosphate,
s 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 • bases ~ adenine, thymine, cytosine, guanine.)

-

..
Normally the ONA message is said to
reaiide in the base sequence, that is, only
the aperiodic part, which detetmines the
amino acid sequence in proteins. (This is
what Hofstadter terms an "inner message.")
Yet DNA must a,+so "communicate" how it is
to be read, its decoding mechanismr that
is, it must provide for its interaction
~ith a variety of enzymes. (Hofstadter
calls the S?ecif ication of decoding procedures the ''outer message.") A great
proportion (but not all) of tbis message
is located in the spatial structure and
chemical properties of the sugar-phosphate
back~one.
In this case, then, the inner
message embodies hi9h information and the
outer message embodies high constraint,
though both components of the message are
read simultaneously.
The third way by which the tension
between variety and constraint may be
resolved is to communicate '~ message which
is first perceived as havin9 high information but whose structure is soon thereafter cognized. This is succinctly
summarized in the expressive statement of
Gr•y (19741:
"Meaning is the digestion of
newness into sameness." Newness is information: sameness is isomor?hism of
structure.
for example, up to the end of a good
detective or mystery story there will appear to be no order (in the explicit
clues, in the characters of the protagonists, etc), but when the mystery is
finally revealed, the pieces fall into
place. What seemed to be a situation of
maximum chaos is revealed to be a situation of maximum order. It is not a
compromise that is reached between information and constraint. Rather, both
e~tremes are superposed, but sequentially.
Here, too, the frame message (include in
this the specification of genre) is
essential. The reader can bear the multiplicity of yet unrelated facts because
the frame message guarantees the existence of some unifying order. Either it
can be figured out by the reader--this is
t~e challenge 9osed by this 9enM--or it
will finally be revealed in the end,
This means of reconciling the conneeds ~f information and constraint
is not restricted to the detective or
mystery story, but is a general feature of
the novel and applies to masterpieces as
well as potboilers. All this refers·to
t~e single level of plot, but such dialectical tensions and reconciliations exist
at multiple structural levels in litera~y works, as well as in other artistic
media.
(See, e.g ••. Moles, 1958, Chapter
Vt, and the discussion of ~ardner, 1978,
of the work of Voss and the theory of f ractals of Benott Mandelbrot.}
~rary

Another example of this general
schema is the placing of the verb in

German at the end of sentences; anticipation and suspense enhance the infor•
mational richness of the message when
t:he key to its meaning is finally de1 i vered. Here, too, the frame message
("This is a sentence in German") sustains the listener by providing a guarantee of the eventual comprehensibility
of the utterance.
Tnis approach of reconciling the
conflicting needs of information and
constraint can also be varied by pcoceeding, not from information to
constraint, but in the reverse direction. Rather than being derived from
the recognition of order in apparent
disorder, meaning may be based u~on the
introduction of new variety, and hence
imperfection, into existing constra·int.
In imperfection there is novelty
and thus information. This information
has meaning since it occurs in the context of a recognized constraint. Moreover, the imperfection not only creates
novelty but actual tension, which sustains interest in the unfolding, spatial
and/or temporal, of the work. But the
matter does not stop here. The tension
must be resolved, i.e., the imperfectio~
removed, typically by being perceived as
lawful, i.e., the reflectior. of a "hi~;:i
er• (more encompassing) ordering principle. This means of reconciling the
two needs of com~unication can be linkec
to the earlier approach discussed above:
One proceeds to order either fcom disorder or from the distortion or
imperfection in some prior ordec. Or
there may be some genuine, if icregular,
alternacion of banality and originality (Moles, l9S8).

In summary, then, while Shannon's
information theory does. not explicitly
speak of meaning, the quantitative measure of information introduced by that
theory cannot be dissociated fcom discussions of the semantic level of
communication. "Information" and "meaning" are, rather, ultimately linked, via
the universal dialectical complementarity of information and constraint. The
tension produced by this complementari:1
can be resolved in a number of al~erna
tive ~ays, the consideration of which
gives rise to several cifferent meanings
of "meaning."
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